A Man Between Worlds: The Story of Persia’s American Reformer
Owen Steuernagel
At the dusk of Iran’s constitutional revolution, an idealistic, young and talented American left his country with a mission – to reorganize and develop the financial system of the dynasty that had ruled Persia for the past two hundred years. By that time, the absolute monarchy of the Qajars had suffered successive episodes of glorious mismanagement under the purview of the shahs and colonial officers. The Russians and British, who had subliminally battled over the country in a war of treaties and concessions had allied and split the nation into spheres of influence leaving Persia to struggle on its own in the face of colonial encroachment. Faced with this dilemma, the only recently formed Majles (Parliament) of Persia decided to request help from the United States in the form of a financial advisor. Their request was met in the form of William Morgan Shuster, a thirty-four-year-old administrator from Washington. In May of 1911, he arrived in Tehran.
The years preceding Shuster’s arrival had been tumultuous for Persia. Growing discontent among the population due to financial mismanagement paired with colonial pressure had allowed a strong movement of constitutionalists to sprout. In 1906, the constitutionalists persuaded the monarch Mozaffar ad-Din Shah to sign a constitutional proclamation establishing the Majles on his deathbed. But before this parliament could consolidate its authority, the new Shah Mohammad Ali bombarded the parliament with support from Russian authorities and reestablished absolute rule over the nation. A civil war ensued, with constitutionalist forces ultimately taking Tehran in 1909 forcing Mohammad Ali to abdicate in favor of his young son and leaving the Majles in effective control of the country. Upon taking the reins of power, the Majles realized the financial state of affairs were in dire need of reorganization. Lacking the expertise to solve this entanglement themselves, the Majlis requested an advisor from the United States. During the early 1900s, the United States were regarded as the pinnacle of representative democracy by Persian constitutionalists, as they were founded in opposition to absolute rule similar to the one they had struggled so fiercely against. It also had the benefit of acting as a counterweight to the Russians and British who had taken advantage of Persia’s weak position. The Majles sent a formal request to the U.S. Congress, and upon recommendation from President William Howard Taft, Shuster was chosen for the job. He had been an administrator in the American Colonial Philippines, and gained a reputation for being efficient and pragmatic while having good knowledge of accounting and organization. This ability led to him being promoted to Secretary of Education in the colony, all at the age of 29. Taft’s agreement to the Majles’s request came at a condition: Shuster would not be there as an employee of the U.S. government, but the Persian one. Once he landed in Persia, he would be on his own, without support from his government.
When Shuster arrived in Tehran with his entourage of assistants, he inquired into the state of affairs of the nation. The Dynasty was deeply indebted to the Russian Empire and had a deficit of 400,000 U.S. dollars (approximately 14 million dollars today). Additionally, no centralized tax collection service existed, and revenues were collected by individual ministries and spent within each. Thus, Persia had no national budget, and there was no oversight of government funds. This lack of a cohesive financial system led to the coffers of the Qajar state being systemically looted by a kleptocratic dual force of opportunistic colonial officers and nepotistic Persian nobles. In his memoir, compiled shortly after his return to America, Shuster stated:
“I might say that the Persian finances were tangled —very tangled —had there been any to tangle. There were no Persian finances in any ordinary sense of the word.” – The Strangling of Persia (p.38)
In order to rejuvenate the treasury and end incessant pilfering, the Majles voted to give Shuster complete control of the nation’s finances in an unprecedented vote of confidence. Shuster ordered all banks in Tehran to only process government checks with his official seal on them, putting him in charge of all expenditures and collections of the dynasty. He then attempted to assemble a several thousand strong tax collection gendarme to ensure collections were enforced. The man he wanted to head the gendarme was Major C.B. Stokes, a British attaché working in Persia. He spoke Persian well and was well acquainted with the country. But upon requesting his support from the British legation, the British legation refused as not to ire the Russians in their northern sphere of influence. Prevented from employing the best man, his ability to collect taxes beyond the city centres was limited. To make matters worse, the deposed Mohammad Ali Shah returned from his exile with Russian support and began to attempt to overthrow the constitutionalist government. Shuster pressured the government to declare him and his brothers fugitives and placed a bounty on his head. According to Shuster, there was “literally no Persian army except on paper” so he hired Armenian and Bakhtiari mercenaries to hunt down the fugitive shah. He hid 1500 rifles in his office, and began confiscating property from the shah’s brothers. This infuriated Russia, and Russian forces began pouring over the border into Northern Persia demanding that Shuster be removed. They gave Persia an ultimatum – remove Shuster from his post within forty-eight hours or face a full-fledged invasion. Not wanting to give up Shuster or resign themselves to Russian invasion, the Majles contacted the U.S. Congress in a final plea. The congress, lacking an understanding of Persia’s affairs and wishing to side with the familiar European powers in a dangerous political climate, dismissed the plea. The Majles then piled in for a final vote and unanimously voted in favor of Shuster and rejected the ultimatum. It was not only a vote for Shuster, but a vote for their sovereignty as a nation. Persia resisted Russian influence for a few more months before pro-Russian lawmakers instituted a violent coup in December 1911. The Russian flag was raised above government buildings in Tabriz, and Shuster departed shortly afterward for America. The Majles, Persia’s constitutional period, and Shuster’s tenure were finished.
Any man greeted in a foreign nation with the waving of the American flag, bolstered with support so steadfast that the entire parliament would rather have their nation invaded than fire him is no longer a mere financial consultant. He was a champion of Persia’s constitutional cause, and a hero to the parliament and nation he was hired to represent. When he returned home to America, he gave his own account of this history in his memoir, The Strangling of Persia, attacking the foreign influence he had witnessed. Shuster was not the first American to step foot in Persia, nor would he be the last. Howard Bakersville, a missionary from Nebraska, had died fighting in the Constitutional Revolution and was christened the “American Lafayette of Iran” by Sattar Khan, one of its chief leaders.
America enjoyed high standing in the consciousness of the Persian people. Shuster wrote:
“I am still unable to imagine what the name American conveyed or what any American could have previously done, to have excited the interests of the Persian people to the extent to which we apparently did.” – The Strangling of Persia (p.15)
The Persian government and people, through the actions of American citizens acting independently of their government with a can-do idealistic spirit, erroneously believed that their government would reflect their benevolent attitude. Instead, they were rejected by the congress, dismissed as an irrelevant nation and ridiculed. Rather than side with emerging democracies and nations that wished to follow its path, the American government instead decided to reinforce the old colonial order. If rather than dismissing the wishes and loyalty of Persia, the American government had instead understood, empathized and supported the constitutionalist cause of Persia, the next hundred years of American-Iran relations may have followed a very different path.
Readings
Ghaneabassiri, Kamyar. “U.S. Foreign Policy and Persia, 1856–1921.” Iranian Studies, vol. 35, no. 1/3, 2002, pp. 145–75.
Ghazvinian, John. America and Iran: A History, 1720 to the Present. Knopf, 2021.
Shuster, Morgan. The Strangling of Persia. 1st ed., Houghton Mifflin Company, 1912.
Avery, Peter at al., ed. The Cambridge History of Iran, vol.7: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic. Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Owen Steuernagel
he / his
