Few political actors today have invested as much strategic energy in reshaping global ideas of democracy as the Communist Party of China (CPC). From exporting governance training to parts of Africa to presenting the “China model” as not merely different but superior, Beijing has adopted a wide range of tools to advance this ambition. Among the most notable is its sprawling narrative project: an effort to question, recast, and ultimately dilute the long-held assumption that liberal democracy is the only viable path to prosperity and stability.

This broader effort has included sustained critiques of foreign elections. A close look at Chinese media and academic commentary during the intensive 2024 global election cycle reveals how deeply this narrative has been absorbed into China’s propaganda ecosystem. With more than sixty countries heading to the polls, Chinese outlets repeatedly warned of the instability and unpredictability of electoral systems, especially in societies grappling with economic strain or developmental pressures. Within this discourse, the United States and India assumed particular prominence — both as geopolitical competitors and as representatives of a political ideal the Party seeks to deconstruct.

Through repeated depictions of dysfunction, polarisation and disorder, the CPC has attempted to advance a counter-claim: that China’s Party-State model provides a more coherent, efficient and socially stable form of governance. Foreign elections have become discursive battlegrounds on which Beijing contests the universality of liberal democracy and positions its own system as a preferable alternative.

Redefining Democracy with Chinese Characteristics

The Party’s re-articulation of democracy was formally codified in its 2021 white paper, China: Democracy That Works. The document marked a turning point in the CPC’s effort to detach the idea of democracy from electoral procedure and re-anchor it in governance outcomes. Legitimacy, it argued, flows not from competitive elections but from the state’s ability to deliver tangible results.

By shifting the criteria of “democracy” from political contestation to performance, the CPC challenged the supposed normative primacy of liberal systems — particularly that of the United States — while reframing its own model as substantively democratic. This reframing sits at the heart of China’s global narrative project and echoes Xi Jinping’s call to “tell China’s story well”. Across policy papers, state media and think-tank diplomacy, the Party has sought to embed a new political vocabulary, one that interprets democratic values through a results-driven, culturally specific lens.

Within this framework, the 2024 U.S. election was presented as further evidence of liberal democracy’s internal decay. Commentaries depicted a process mired in factionalism and performative partisanship, less about policy vision than political survival. Polarisation, identity politics and lobbying influence were held up as symptoms of a “low-quality democracy” incapable of reconciling national interests with social stability. A similar tone was adopted toward India’s national elections, where coverage highlighted social division, religious tension and political polarisation.

Across these critiques, the ideological message was consistent: liberal democracies may appear vibrant, but they are hollow in substance. China’s own “whole-process people’s democracy” is presented as a model that reconciles efficiency with legitimacy, delivering long-term policy continuity and social cohesion — qualities that, in the Party’s view, electoral systems cannot reliably produce.

The Contest for Political Legitimacy

What is at stake in this redefinition of political ideals is more than perception management. The possibility of reshaping global understandings of democracy carries strategic value for Beijing. The more countries that view legitimacy through the lens of performance rather than procedure, the more China can influence international norms in ways aligned with its political interests.

There is some appeal to this narrative in parts of the Global South, particularly among political elites frustrated by the volatility of electoral politics or disillusioned with governance outcomes. China’s promise of stability, order and decisiveness offers an attractive contrast for leaders navigating institutional fragility or public fatigue. The CPC’s intention is not to dismiss democracy outright, but to relativise it — to transform a supposedly universal ideal into a flexible concept that different systems can claim on their own terms.

Yet the strength of this approach is also its most visible limitation. A narrative built heavily on the dysfunctions of others risks drawing attention to the silences within China’s own system: the absence of open mechanisms for self-correction, the lack of independent scrutiny, and the dangers of equating stability with legitimacy. The Party’s claim to efficiency carries weight only while it can sustain growth and maintain social cohesion — conditions that are now being tested.

Still, China’s increasingly polished narrative project poses a challenge democracies can ill afford to ignore. This is not simply a contest of regimes but a contest of stories — of who gets to define what democracy means and why it matters.

For democracies, the response cannot rest on rebuttals or defensive rhetoric. It requires narratives that acknowledge dysfunction yet frame it within a broader story of reform, resilience and representation. The real struggle of our time is not only over power or prosperity, but over political meaning itself. If China aims to persuade parts of the world that democracy has failed, then democratic systems must be ready to demonstrate, in practice as well as narrative, why — despite their flaws — they remain one of the most enduring expressions of collective freedom.