On 1 September 2025, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Plus meeting, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the Global Governance Initiative (GGI). He pledged a “more just and equitable world order” (更加公正和公平的国际秩序) founded on shared development and joint stewardship. Xi vowed to reject “power politics” and to strengthen the United Nations, casting the SCO as a new pillar of fairness in uncertain times.

Harmony or Hegemony?

Weeks later, however, Chinese patrols in the South China Sea issued sharp warnings to Philippine vessels during joint US–Japan exercises—an escalation that exposed the gap between lofty rhetoric and assertive practice. The tension between appeals to harmony and displays of hierarchy recalls the ancient Chinese idea of Tianxia (天下), or “All Under Heaven”.

Once a Confucian vision of moral order under a virtuous ruler, Tianxia has re-emerged in both academic and political discourse. It offers a cosmology of ethical governance, yet one that can conceal dominance behind the language of harmony.

This essay revisits Tianxia’s origins, its modern reinterpretation by philosopher Zhao Tingyang, its reflection in Xi Jinping’s statecraft, and the global implications of its revival in 2025.

A Moral Cosmology

At its heart, Tianxia imagined the world as a moral fabric woven from virtue (de, 德), reciprocity (li, 礼), and harmony (he, 和*).*

The ideal ruler governed not through coercion but through moral gravity—his virtue aligning society as the heavens align the stars. Li (ritual reciprocity) provided the framework of tributes, alliances and hierarchies that maintained balance. He (harmony) turned diversity into strength rather than threat.

Historically, China’s tributary system embodied this outlook: neighbouring polities offered homage not solely from fear but also in recognition of the centre’s moral and cultural authority. The Mandate of Heaven (tianming) anchored legitimacy in virtue—revocable if moral order declined, as dynastic collapses from the Shang onwards attested.

This moral contingency distinguished Tianxia from coercive empire, though in practice power often eclipsed virtue.

In 2025, Tianxia is more than a historical memory. It is being re-imagined for the global stage, challenging the Westphalian system of sovereign states amid climate crisis and technological upheaval.

A World Without an Outside

Contemporary philosopher Zhao Tingyang has revived Tianxia as an ethical framework for a fragmented world. He envisions “a world without an outside”, where moral reciprocity dissolves the boundaries of sovereignty and rivalry. His principle of “harmony without uniformity” proposes plural unity guided by virtue rather than force.

In The Whirlpool That Produced China (2024), Zhao argues that Chinese civilisation arose through centripetal cooperation, not conquest. He likens it to a “whirlpool” drawing diverse communities into shared order—an image of inclusion rather than expansionism.

Yet reviewers, including those in The Paper (澎湃新闻) and Beijing Cultural Review (文化纵横), have warned that Zhao’s narrative risks mythologising Sinocentrism. His ideal of harmony may be noble, but in a multipolar world the question remains: who defines virtue?

From Philosophy to Practice

Xi Jinping’s speeches often echo Tianxia’s moral lexicon. At the SCO summit, the GGI invoked “civilisational dialogue” and “mutual learning”, presenting China as a moral pivot of global governance.

In policy terms, the record is mixed. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been re-cast around “small yet beautiful projects”, emphasising renewable energy and local development. In 2025, China expanded clean-energy partnerships with Saudi Arabia and signed US $23 billion in infrastructure and mining contracts with Kazakhstan.

Contradictions persist. Panama became the first Latin American country to withdraw from the BRI in February 2025, citing US pressure and debt concerns. In the South China Sea, Chinese coastguards issued stern warnings to Philippine ships even as Beijing described its artificial islands as “marine reserves of harmony”. Meanwhile Vietnam accelerated land reclamation in the Spratlys, mirroring China’s earlier tactics.

The result is a vision of unity coupled with conduct that redraws the region’s power map.

Promise and Pitfall

Tianxia’s attraction lies in its moral promise of order. Yet critics warn that harmony can silence dissent. When one centre defines virtue, harmony risks degenerating into hierarchy.

The Westphalian order, despite its rivalries, provides procedural equality through sovereignty, law and representation. Realists note that great-power competition cannot be moralised away. The South China Sea exemplifies this dilemma: China presents its dominance as stewardship; Vietnam replicates it under the same guise. Both employ the idiom of harmony to cloak strategic ambition.

As one South-East Asian diplomat remarked in 2025, the GGI sometimes appears as “hegemonism in multilateral drag.”

Why Tianxia Still Matters

The revival of Tianxia is more than an intellectual trend. It challenges us to imagine what world order might look like beyond sovereignty. Could interdependence—ethical, ecological and digital—replace competition as the foundation of international politics?

Beijing is already testing this vision through its notion of a “community of shared future for humankind”, extending to proposals for cyber- and AI governance sometimes dubbed “digital Tianxia.” These frameworks may influence how tomorrow’s technologies are regulated.

If realised inclusively, Tianxia could foster cooperation across divides. If monopolised, it risks dressing empire in moral robes.

As borders blur and crises converge, Tianxia urges us to ask whether harmony can ever exist without hierarchy—and whether “all under heaven” can truly mean all.