China’s revival of anti-Japanese narratives in the context of worsening economic conditions at home and deteriorating international relations, serves not only as historical remembrance but as a tool to consolidate legitimacy and navigate contemporary challenges.

The Enduring Role of the War of Resistance in Contemporary China

On June 19, 2025, the Chinese Party-state announced it would hold a military parade on September 3 to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. This symbolic political-military event illustrates the continuing role of war memory in shaping modern Chinese nationalism. In particular, it reflects how anti-Japanese sentiment, cultivated and maintained by the Party-state, remains a foundational element of national identity.

The act of celebration also reveals the political outlook of the current leadership. Xi Jinping has repeatedly expressed nationalist positions, through both rhetoric and action. His stance may be seen as part of a broader global wave of post-2008 financial crisis nationalism, which has given rise to populist leaders around the world—from Trump in the US and Putin in Russia to Modi in India and Erdoğan in Turkey.

China’s last major military parade was in 2019, marking the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic. The 2025 event aligns with a broader international trend of performative nationalism: Russia’s Victory Day parade on May 9, the United States’ military-themed celebration on June 14 for the 250th anniversary of its armed forces, and now China’s PLA parade. Together, they signal how historical commemoration has become a stage for asserting national strength.

Anti-Japanese Sentiment and Regional Memory Politics

Anti-Japanese sentiment in China has persisted since the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), and remains embedded in political culture, public opinion, and educational curricula. According to a 2016 Pew Research Centre survey, only 14% of Chinese respondents had a favourable view of Japan, and just 11% of Japanese respondents viewed China positively—a decline in mutual sentiment compared to 2006.

Such hostility is not isolated to China. Throughout Asia, historical memory, intertwined with contemporary economic and political rivalries, shapes how publics perceive one another. Yet in China, the state plays a more active role in curating and institutionalising memory, often through textbooks, museums, state media, and commemorative events.

This long-standing animosity also serves a broader strategic function. Anti-Japanese narratives have been used to define patriotic behaviour, foster national cohesion, and justify the Party’s historical role—particularly its victory over imperialism and internal adversaries. The war memory is thus not only about China’s past suffering but also about legitimising the Party’s enduring authority.

Strategic Importance of the Anti-Japanese War in CCP Historiography

The War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression occupies a critical position in Chinese historiography. It is presented as the first sustained national mobilisation against a modern imperial power. It was also a decisive moment in the CCP’s rise, allowing the Party to expand its influence through the Second United Front with the Kuomintang (KMT) and establish a presence in northern China.

This period remains central to the Party’s broader narrative of the “century of humiliation”—a framing that links China’s historical victimhood to its present-day quest for rejuvenation. The war against Japan is not only remembered as a fight for national survival but also as a formative struggle that laid the foundations for the eventual communist victory in 1949.

Memory as Political Instrument

Beyond the military parade, the Party has announced a series of commemorative activities for 2025. These include the distribution of medals to war veterans and their families, participation by representatives from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and the overseas Chinese community, and remembrances of key incidents such as the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (July 7), the Mukden Incident (September 18), and the Nanjing Massacre (December 13).

These events function as more than acts of remembrance. They allow the Party to:

1. Reassert its monopoly over historical memory, positioning itself as the defender of national dignity;

2. Foster national unity through shared narratives of trauma and resistance;

3. Respond to contemporary challenges—economic headwinds, rising youth discontent, and external pressure—by invoking patriotic resilience and sacrifice.

In this way, historical commemoration becomes a form of political messaging, aimed at reinforcing regime legitimacy and strengthening ideological cohesion at a time of uncertainty.

Nationalism in Transition: Anti-American Sentiment and Strategic Messaging

While anti-Japanese narratives remain potent, Chinese nationalism has evolved over the past decade to include growing anti-American sentiment. This trend has been shaped by multiple factors: the escalation of US-China rivalry, particularly in the Indo-Pacific; Trump-era visa restrictions on Chinese students; and racist attacks against Chinese nationals in the West during the COVID-19 pandemic.

However, the CCP’s decision to foreground anti-Japanese memory in this year’s commemorations—rather than focus explicitly on U.S. antagonism—reveals a careful calibration of its nationalist messaging. Anti-Japanese rhetoric offers historical legitimacy and moral clarity. It positions China as a victim of fascist aggression and aligns the country with the Allied victory in World War II, generating greater international sympathy.

By contrast, an overt anti-American narrative may carry greater diplomatic risks and could appear confrontational. The Party appears to prefer a symbolic nationalism rooted in historical grievance rather than one that explicitly targets current adversaries. This approach allows the CCP to appeal to both domestic audiences and international observers with a message of national pride without crossing into outright provocation.

Conclusion: Past as Present

The 80th anniversary commemorations of the War of Resistance are more than historical retrospection. They reflect how the CCP actively shapes collective memory to serve present political needs. Through the careful staging of parades, ceremonies, and symbolic acts, the Party reaffirms its role as guardian of the nation’s dignity and architect of its revival.

In doing so, the war against Japan is remembered not only as a historical event but as a living narrative—one that continues to define patriotism, legitimise authority, and navigate a shifting geopolitical environment. As China faces both internal challenges and external competition, war memory remains a central pillar of its nationalist project.