Strategic dependence is perhaps the primary concern amongst parliamentarians as the UK redefines its relationship with China. Positions that have emerged in the past year on supply chain security, critical national infrastructure, disinformation, cyberspace and foreign investment screening – all reflect an acceptance that we must strengthen against the risks posed by ‘the biggest state-based threat to the UK’s economic security’. Expect to see a post-pandemic push to diversify supply chains intensify in security-critical areas such as critical minerals (China controls around 90% of the world’s supply) and frontier technologies.
Countering foreign interference is also high on the agenda. In the wake of the Christine Lee affair, in which MI5 warned that a CCP ‘agent’ was operating in Westminster, lawmakers have recognised that the UK’s toolkit for dealing with malign interference is in need of updating. New counter state threat legislation is likely to include provisions on transparency in ownership and financing from authoritarian states. Partnerships between Chinese state-linked entities and British universities that risk compromising national security will also come under further scrutiny. In countering interference from hostile states, precision in our language and stated intentions will be crucial to protect diaspora groups that have been on the receiving end of an uptick in anti-Asian racism in recent times.
Beyond the UK’s borders, there’s a drive to compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by working with G7 allies to provide sustainable support to the Global South. After hosting the COP26 summit last year, the UK is well-positioned to provide green infrastructure solutions, research, and capacity building to those most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. The next step is to flesh out a more concrete roadmap for British overseas development finance initiatives.
The UK is in the final stage of acceding to the CPTPP Trans-Pacific Trade Bloc, and we played a lead role in forming the AUKUS trilateral security pact. These are the first practical illustrations of what ‘Global Britain’ means. Making a success of our more ambitious foreign policy prospectus will hinge on new partnerships with nations that we share strategic interests.
Finally, we must continue to carve out channels for cooperation with China. The CRG has emphasised the need for the UK to improve its China capabilities, encompassing everything from Mandarin teaching in schools to FCDO career pathways. The UK should continue to open its doors to talented Chinese students and migrants and maximise the benefits of cultural exchange.
Vaccines still need to be widely distributed across the Global South – this may be an opportunity to work alongside China and tap into its vast networks for a universal win. We will also have to find ways to convince Beijing to accelerate its decarbonisation efforts if we are to solve the world’s most urgent existential threat.
Discussions of UK China strategies can often deprive China of agency. Recent times have taught us developments in China that are beyond our control can have world-altering consequences and a significant impact on British livelihoods.
There are still many great opportunities in our relationship with China, but we can only realise them if we are able to create frameworks that safeguard our interests and engage the whole of British society with the greatest geopolitical challenge of our generation.